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AS MANY AS TEN STATES stand poised to conclude negotiations
with the EU for full membership by the end of 2002. This prospect
has elicited much anxiety about the prospect of gridlock in
European institutions, stagnation in European integration, or
popular backlash in European countries, East and West. We
submit, to the contrary, that the entry of new members is more
likely to reinforce existing incremental trends in EU politics,
including the shift in attention from classic economic cooperation
to cooperation outside of the first pillar, growing conflict over
the budget, the declining persuasiveness of any grand projet,
and the dissipation of the goal of “United States of Europe” as a
widely-held ideal for Europe. Fears of gridlock, stagnation or
backlash are exaggerated; the more likely result is a strengthening
of the status quo.
Neither the success of enlargement nor the terms on which
it is taking place should come as a surprise to either theoretically
aware observers of international relations or historically aware
observers of European integration.1 Enlargement rests on the
convergent interests of existing and potential members. EU
leaders promote accession because they consider enlargement to
have longer-term economic and geopolitical benefits—the
creation of commercial opportunities and the stabilization of
neighboring countries (Grabbe 2001). East European states
similarly participate because EU membership brings access to
the world’s largest single market, strengthening of political ties
with the West, and the stabilization of domestic democracy and
capitalism. The latter advantages are particularly clear when
compared to the “costs of exclusion”—that is, the potentially
catastrophic costs of staying behind while others advance. While
the candidates have had to comply with the EU’s requirements
and acquiesce to certain unfavorable terms, EU membership has
remained a matter of net national interest. These adjustments,
like most economic reforms costly in the short-term, are viewed
as inevitable steps toward long-term convergence.2
The accession countries, to be sure, are in a weak bargaining
position and must therefore make concessions—a fact that is
often invoked as evidence for the fundamental injustice of
enlargement. Yet the underlying reason for this asymmetry in
bargaining power is rarely taken into account: while existing
EU members and candidates will both benefit from the basic
fact of enlargement, the candidates benefit more. For the eastern
candidates, the benefits of basic membership outweigh the costs
so substantially that they have a very strong preference for
reaching an agreement. This greatly reduces their bargaining
leverage with EU members over the terms of their accession to
the EU. During the final phase of the enlargement negotiations
taking place at the end of 2002, they are choosing to make
significant short-term concessions—but only in exchange for the
long-term advantages that accrue uniquely from EU membership.
This simple logic of “asymmetrical interdependence”—those who
benefit the most from a policy must sacrifice the most on the
margin—is the most profound factor shaping the negotiations.3
Yet the negotiation phase is nearly complete, and the spotlight
is turning now to the consequences of as many as ten new states
joining the EU—perhaps as early as 2004. How will these states
behave as new members of the EU? How will their choices impact
the course of future European integration? The basic relationship
of “asymmetric interdependence” between the members and
candidates will change subtly once they are members, and this
will have four important consequences for the disposition of the
EU’s new member states.
First, the new members will enter as moderately well-
qualified member states. The political consequences of the
fundamental asymmetry have been evident in the pre-accession
process, in which applicants must satisfy the Copenhagen criteria
and adopt the acquis in its entirety to qualify for membership.
The resulting negotiations have until recently been little more
than a process of checking off a massive and essentially non-
negotiable list of EU laws and regulations, chapter by chapter.
The asymmetry of power between the EU and the candidates
facilitates this transformation. The EU can exclude any that do
not conform to the broad political and economic parameters of
national politics in the EU. This process will continue. Slovakia,
for example, will be kept out of the EU if the Slovak voters
return a nationalist government to power in late 2002.
Thus, the transition from communism has meant not only
that a market economy must be constructed from the ground up,
but also that a modern regulatory state capable of implementing
the EU’s acquis must be put in place—a task far more formidable
than that previous enlargement countries faced. For the
construction of a well-functioning market economy and a strong,
democratic state—long-term goals that are hardly in question—
the requirements for EU membership have been, on balance,
positive (Vachudova 2001a). For its part, the EU will thus not
be derailed for having admitted poorly qualified states.
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Second, new members are unlikely to support great strides
forward in European integration. After joining, accession
countries will be working to satisfy requirements for full
membership in Schengen and in the EMU. They hardly need
more to digest. A measure of Euroskepticism is rising among
applicant countries that have received stiff report cards from the
Commission every autumn for almost a decade, and now must
endure pressure for unpopular concessions in the last phase of
negotiations.
In existing EU member countries, enlargement is also
unpopular with voters, many of whom associate it with rising
illegal immigration, international crime, and unemployment.
While there is little evidence that enlargement will contribute
measurably to any of these problems—to the contrary!—EU
politicians have nonetheless faced restive publics. In the short-
term, any electoral response will be blunted by the negotiated
outcome. The asymmetry of power between the EU and the
candidates renders accommodation relatively easy: new members
will not be allowed to lift their internal Schengen borders for
many years; they will be required to reinforce their external
borders; and they will wait for up to seven years after accession
before their citizens enjoy the right, at least in the abstract, to
live and work anywhere in the EU (Vachudova 2001b). Before
the decade is out, the issue may recede as stagnant population
growth in the EU leaves old members scrambling to attract
workers from the new members or third countries.
Third, the new states are likely to bargain hard on budgetary
issues after they enter. The next twelve prospective new members
are highly diverse, but they are also numerous and almost certain
to agree that any financial advantages old members enjoy over
them should be reversed. If they join forces, they will collectively
have the ability to block not just unanimous votes (such as those
on treaty change or budgetary matters) but some qualified
majority votes. Given that it will be difficult for the EU to settle
the budget for 2007 onwards prior to enlargement, the candidates
will already be full members by the time the EU starts the next
round of budgetary negotiations. The long transition periods and
unequal benefits currently being imposed on the applicant
countries have instructed them that only by playing tough in EU
bargaining can they get a better deal, just as they learned in the
1990s that only full membership would give them full access to
the EU market. For all these reasons, new members are nearly
certain to deploy their voting power in an effort to secure a greater
share of EU spending. This is likely to be a major EU concern
for the next decade, just as it was for the periods immediately
following previous accessions.
Fourth, new members are unlikely to import divergent or
destabilizing policy agendas into the EU. Many fear that new
members will spark unprecedented conflict within the EU. The
real threat of disruption comes not from the sheer number of
participants at a Council or Commission tour de table (a prospect
about which Brussels insiders seem obsessed), but the increasing
diversity of the policy preferences of EU member states.
Yet this diversity, while undeniably real, is unlikely to divert
existing trends in European integration. EU member states have
no consensual “grand project” that could easily be stalled by the
vetoes of unruly new members seeking budgetary side payments.
This has been the lesson of three successive treaty amendment
exercises. Nor would it be easy for new members to employ
their voting power in QMV to block legislation, since the internal
market is largely complete and everyday legislation moves
forward at a slower pace than ten years ago. Today EU
governments are instead prioritizing policy areas that lie partly
outside of the first pillar, such as foreign policy, immigration
policy, and monetary policy.
In precisely these areas of current interest outside of the
first pillar—and some within it—flexible institutional
mechanisms other than majority voting can be used to combat
gridlock. Nearly every significant recent initiative in the EU has
involved only (or has provisions to involve only) a subset of EU
members: EMU, social policy, foreign and defense policy,
environmental policy, Schengen, etc. The trend is toward
differentiation, flexibility and ad hoc arrangements. In many of
these areas—foreign policy and flanking policies to EMU being
prime examples—uniformity is not required for effective policy-
making. From the perspective of collective action theory, the EU
is more about coordinating “coalitions of the willing” than
avoiding “free riding.” Meanwhile, member governments no
doubt favor flexibility, though they do not say so in public, as a
means to avoid placing themselves in a position where poorer
countries can extort financial side-payments.
In conclusion, the consequence of enlargement is unlikely
to be gridlock, stagnation or backlash. Instead, enlargement is
most likely to reinforce existing trends in the EU: trends toward
diversity and differentiation, tighter limits on spending, reform
of the major fiscal policies (CAP and structural funds),
incremental evolution rather than grands projets, and broad
acceptance that the EU is unlikely to develop into a “United
States of Europe” (Moravcsik 1998a). This is neither novel nor
ominous. It signals instead that the EU is becoming a more
“normal” polity—one that has established itself beyond the point
of no return and can thus afford to tolerate a diversity of opinion
about its future course.
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Notes
1. The argument in this paper is set forth in more detail in
Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003.
2. For a contrary view, see Schimmelfennig 2000, who views
enlargement as the result of rhetorical entrapment—West
European countries, he believes, uttered idealistic rhetoric and
then found themselves unable to resist demands to realize it.
While only more detailed research can demonstrate the extent
to which Schimmelfennig is correct, we note only that his
theory is deployed to explain the relatively narrow difference
between a special arrangement with potential members and
membership.
3. For a similar interpretation of bargaining among existing
member states during the course of European integration, see
Moravcsik 1998b.